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NOTE:
THIS PAPER WAS PUBLISHED IN EARLY 2000s
An
emerging issue
Disaster
preparedness for water utilities
by Engr. Antonio
B. Magtibay, MNSA
 Introduction.
The number of people affected by natural disasters has been
increasing from 147 million per year to 211 million since
1991 to 2000. More than 665,000 people died in 2,557 natural
disasters, 90 percent of which was water related. Of this
water-related disasters, floods accounted for about 50 percent,
water borne diseases about 28 percent and droughts about
11 percent.
It is projected that water-related crisis will not abate
anytime soon. The off-coast earthquake in Indonesia and
the tsunami that it generated is one of the most devastating
in recent years. Though spared of that cataclysmic event
due to geographical factors, the Philippines also had its
share of water-related disasters. Thousands died in the
floods and landslides caused by typhoons and landslides
in the provinces of Quezon, Nueva Ecija, Aurora and Pampanga.
The current year was met by disasters of the man-made type.
The Valentine bombings highlighted the vulnerabilities of
soft targets which the terrorists may exploit willfully
anytime. There is increasing concern that drinking water
utilities may also be targets of attacks. The Philippines
Task Force on Security of Critical Infrastructures (TFSCI)
ranked water supply among the top of the eleven possible
targets of terrorists.
Today, it is no longer a question of whether natural, accidental,
and intentional disasters will occur. The question is when
will they occur.
Disasters and Their Effects on
Drinking Water Supply Systems
Disasters impede development.
From 1970-2000, the Philippines incurred an annual damage
of P15 Billion due to disasters. In 2004, costs due to disasters
exceeded P33.5 Billion.
Water supply systems are vulnerable to sudden unpredictable
disasters from natural and man-made disasters. Several earthquakes
have adversely affected, water sources and have caused damage
to pipelines. Gen. Santos City WD experienced increased
pipe breakages along their transmission lines whenever a
spate of earthquakes will occur in the area. The Mt. Pinatubo
eruptions in 1991 partially or completely disabled the water
systems of some municipalities in Pampanga, Zambales and
Tarlac. Mt. Mayon’s eruptions have constantly affected
the sources and operations of the water districts in the
immediate vicinity. Incidents of cholera and typhoid fever
are becoming more frequent and one of the causes of the
outbreaks has been attributed rightly or otherwise to the
local water districts.
Fortunately, there have been no documented terrorists attacks
on water supply facilities in the magnitude that will affect
the services as yet. However, water supply systems have
certain characteristics that make them vulnerable to terrorists
attacks: the system covers a large area that may not be
monitored by the WD at all times and; the system have components
that are vulnerable to sabotage, for example, isolated reservoirs
and pumping stations.
Generally there are (2) two types of disasters that we have
to contend with and prepare for: (1) Natural Disasters.
Urban infrastructure is highly vulnerable to natural disasters.
Failures of these structures, such as water supply and other
pipeline systems will most likely result to major impacts
in terms of human lives and economic losses. Natural disasters
can be any or combination of the following: (a) Typhoons.
In the period from Nov. to Dec. of 2004 only, four typhoons
brought havoc to southern Philippines: Unding, Violeta,
Winnie and Yoyong. (b) Floods (c) Heavy monsoon rains (d)
Tsunamis (e) El Nino (f) Droughts (g) Biological agents
(micro-organisms, insects or vermin infestations) (h) Earthquakes.
The Philippines experience 5 quakes/day or 1,825/year and
(i) Volcanic Eruptions. (2) Man-made. Damage to or destruction
of water supply facilities by terrorists attack can disrupt
the delivery of vital human services, threaten public health
and may even cause loss of lives. Some man-made disasters
are: (a) Acts of war and terrorism (b) Vandalism (c) Fires
(d) Explosions (e) Chemical spills (f) Power failures (g)
Systems Failures and (h) Accidents.
Disasters in the operations of the water utilities may also
occur due to neglect and/or failure of the organization
to properly institute and adhere to maintenance procedures.
The issue now is whether the utilities can respond to disasters
to’ avert its negative effects on water services due
to contamination of water supplies, prolonged discontinuity
of service, loss of fire-fighting capability and release
of chlorine in the air among others
Disaster Preparedness and Risk Mitigation (DPRM)
Generally, most water utilities have
no emergency response plans in place that should reduce
the risk of water supply shortage and interruptions and
water quality deterioration both due to natural and man-made
disasters. The lessons learned by the water districts on
their experience with disasters do not accrue to the available
knowledge on the subject.
Contaminated water has its direct and indirect consequences.
Change in water quality and very limited availability of
water supply affect customers’ preferences and behavior.
Consumers are now developing preference to bottled water
instead of water from the taps. Every breakdown in the water
district operations resulting to reduced efficiencies are
arguments that justify the shift to bottled water by consumers.
There’s a need to properly and accurately document
cholera outbreaks. In the provinces of Pangasinan and Camarines
Sur, these health problems were initially and incorrectly
attributed to public water supply systems. Although the
water quality deterioration was traced ultimately to shallow
private wells and other factors such as poor hygienic practices,
the initial negative perception of the public on the water
utilities is both costly and damaging to morale. Likewise,
the responses of several agencies, both private and government
to the Infanta tragedy and similar events must be reviewed
with the end of formulating and institutionalizing a better
response to these emergencies.
The coping capability of the Legazpi City, Tabaco and Daraga
water districts which are located at the foot of Mayon Volcano
on the phenomena of shifting river flows and irregular spring
sources yield will provide other similarly situated water
districts insights in their response to similar crisis.
Status of DPRM in other countries
1.
The US Federal Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act (Bioterrorism Act) June
2002 requires all community water systems that serve 3,300
or more persons to prepare a Vulnerability Assessment
(VA) of their system. It must cover all aspects of the
system including computer systems.
2. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 of US President
George W. Bush establishes a national policy under which
critical infrastructures including drinking water “systems
are to be protected from terrorists attacks.
3. Field testing of the WHO Guidelines to Assess National
Health Capacity to the Deliberate, Use of Biological and
Chemical and Radionuclear Materials (BCRN) were conducted
in some selected countries including the Philippines wherein
field testing was conducted last February 2-21, 2004 in
Metro Manila and Davao.
The events of 9/11 accelerated the development of programs
required to mitigate the vulnerabilities of drinking water
utilities in developed countries. Drinking water utilities
are held responsible for providing a safe and reliable supply
of potable water to their concessionaires with or without
a disaster.
Status
of DPRM in the Philippines
Agencies Involved in Disaster Preparedness
and Risk Mitigation
1.
Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security (COC-IS)
- Handles crisis situation at the national level that
evolve into national security concerns.
2. National Peace and Order Council - Handles crisis
situations arising from peace and order.
3. National Disaster, Coordinating Council- PD 1566
- Responsible for strengthening the Philippine Disaster
Control Capability and Establishing the National Program
on Community Disaster Preparedness.
Advises the President on the status of National Disaster
Preparedness and Management Plans.
Recommends to the President the declaration of State of
Calamity and release of National Calamity Fund as needed.
4. Office of Civil Defense - LOI 19, S-1972
Has the primary task of coordinating the activities and
functions of various government agencies and instrumentalities,
private institutions and civic organizations for the protection
and preservation of life and property during emergencies.
5. Task Force for the Security of Critical Infrastructure
(TFSCI) - Integrates and codifies all initiatives,
programs and procedures to protect critical and vital
infrastructure within the framework of the government’s
counter terrorism policies.
Identified
Critical Infrastructures: (a) Energy (b) Water
Supply (c) Information and Communication (d) Transportation
(e) Banking and Finance (f) Public Health (g) Emergency
Services (h) Agriculture and Food (i) Manufacturing
(j) Government Services and (k) Strategic Commercial
Centers.
6.
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System - Both
Manila Water and Maynilad have their respective Emergency
Response Plans. These operational plans are monitored
and evaluated by the MWSS Regulatory Office.
Manila
Water has a group called Risk, Crisis and Asset Management
Cluster or the RCA Cluster. The Cluster’s objective
is to make Manila Water, as an organization, aware, prepared
and ready for any crisis and emergency that will affect
their services. The programs instituted by the Manila RCA
Cluster consists of (1) Risk Management (2) Crisis Management
and (3) Asset Management.
Maynilad Water is currently focused on consequence management
to mitigate the effects of the twin crisis they are currently
facing: the effects of low water supply due to less rainfall
and the reduced flow from the Umiray sources brought about
by the clogging of the 3.00 meter aqueduct with logs and
debris. The on-going program on the disconnection of illegal
connections and apprehension of booster pump users complement
they over-all program to improve the services.
Selected
Water Districts (WDs)
Zamboanga City WD. A comprehensive Disaster
Preparedness and Consequence Management is in place and
constantly updated to meet evolving threats to both the
WD facilities and personnel. The Emergency Response Plan
has varied activities that include foot patrols in the watershed
to tankering of water to low pressure zones. A strong feature
of their ERP is the very strict enforcement of limited access
of unauthorized personnel to important facilities and the’complete
video coverage of high risk areas.
Urdaneta City WD. After the high incidence
of amoebiasis wherein the WDs were wrongly blamed for the
tragedy, the WDs in Pangasinan led by UCWD strengthened
their institutional partnership with the DOH and provided
assistance to the affected areas that rely on shallow private
wells for their water needs. A strong and sustained media
support played an important role in the information dissemination
during the crisis.
San Jose del Monte City WD. This WD have a Quick
Reaction Team that is tasked to implement their Disaster
Preparedness and Risk Mitigation Plan. Although a composite
team from different operating units in the WD, the operational
capabilities of the team are further enhanced by their training
as reserve officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines Army Affiliated Reserve Unit (AFPAARU).
Recommendations
The development of an ERP for water
utilities, including the water districts; is becoming imperative.
The impact of disasters on water supply and sanitation systems,
may be significantly reduced and the recovery of these systems
may be accelerated by adopting the following measures:
1. Preparation of Disaster Preparedness and Risk Mitigation
Plan - improved response to crisis will benefit the water
districts through early restoration of services and consequently
renewed trust and confidence of the consumers.
2. Development of Vulnerability Assessment tools especially
for the big to very large water districts are imperative
in view of the great impact on the daily lives of the
citizenry if the water supply systems become targets of
man-made harmful acts.
3. Preparation of Vulnerability Assessments (VA) - at
a minimum, the VA must cover the entire system including
computer or other automated systems. AVA may have the
following sections: (a) System description and history;
(b) Major Threats Review (man-made and natural disasters);
(c) Existing Deterrents and Detection Methods; (d) Site
Specific Review; (e) Risk Assessment; (f) Response and
Recovery Methods and (h) Recommendations for Improvements.
(from Comprehensive Environmental. Inc. Technical Revort).
1. System Description and History- a review of pipes and
conveyances, physical barriers, water collection, pretreatment,
treatment, storage and distribution facilities, electronic,
computer systems controlling the water systems, use and
handling of chemicals.
2. Major Threats Review- threats that will substantially
disrupt the ability of the system to provide safe and
reliable supply of drinking water or otherwise present
significant public health concerns.
3. Existing Deterrents and Detection Methods.
4. Site Specific Review. Water supply shortages are not
always due calamitous events or terrorism. Gaps in water
supply and demand may be due to over-all inability of
policy makers and management to foresee the requirements
of the served population and were remiss in their task
of identifying new resources for their growing population.
The VA will identify disasters according to:
a.
Natural
b. Man-made (not deliberate). Lack or poor maintenance-
contamination may occur due to poor maintenance and/or
lack of monitoring to identify potential points of contamination
of the WDs facilities. Operational lapses. Accidents.
c. Malevolent Acts. Physical disruption. Actual damage
to pump stations, pipelines and other facilities that
reduces capability of WD to deliver water services to
its constituents. Bioterrorism/chemical contamination.
Contamination of water supply. Cyber Attacks- can
affect SCADA and other platforms in the WD computer
systems.
5.
Risk Assessment- define risk in tenns of the following
three basic questions: (l) What can go wrong (scenario)?,
(2) Will it happen (likelihood)? and (3) If it happens,
does it matter (consequences)? The steps may include the
following: (a) Planning (b) Threat Assessment (c) Site
Characterization (d) Consequence Assessment (e) System
Effectiveness (f) Risk Analysis. Water Distribution System
is one of the most vulnerable component of a WSS. (a)
Identification contamination and (b) Minimize further
spread of contamination. Pumping Stations- could be protected
better by installing them below grade. Reservoirs- especially
the open ones may be contaminated by bird droppings, decomposing
leaves or insects. On-site Guard Force- enhanced physical
security. Technological Adaptations- development of specially
manufactured large diameter flexible polyurethane hose
to interconnect damage transmission lines. Real-time monitoring
of water quality in every phase of the water supply production
to delivery. Site stocking of frequently damage components,
i.e., pipes;
6. Response and Recovery Methods- restoration of levels
of service with appropriate quality is a vital lifeline
with topmost priority in any crisis situation and the
prompt availability of potable and fire-fighting water
is fundamental prerequisite to mitigate the impacts of
any crisis. (a) Framework for clean-up and recovery and
(b) Improved Response Protocols- addresses the attack
before contamination occurs
Other
Protective Measures
1. Bottling Capabilities for WDs -
besides providing potable water, WDs should now embark on
making potable water portable and handy. (a) The changing
life-style of people requires them to be with their own
bottled water. And (b) Emergency need for water can only
be acted immediately by shipping or transporting water in
bottles.
2. Public Information - incident reports, operations center,
an official spokesperson should be designated. This will
include issuances of public/consumer precautionary ‘measures
and advisories such as Boil Water Orders and installation
of signages to the effect.
3. Coordination with other agencies and/or institutions
- adequate institutional and organizational arrangements
should be undertaken as may be necessary. There must he
clearly defined roles, ‘common terminology, mutual
assistance plans among the entities involved in the endeavor.
Information exchange among the agencies should be enhanced
by internet interactive information exchange system. (1)
Local Government Units (2) Philippine National Police (3)
Media (4) Local Water Utilities Administration (5) MWSS
(6) Manila Water (7) Maynilad (8) Water Districts (9) National
Disaster Coordination Center (10) Office of Civil Defense
(11) Philippine National Red Cross (12) Bureau of Fire Protection
(13) Telecommunications Companies (14.) Amateur Radio Associations
(15) Department of Health (16) Department of Public Works
and Highways (17) Power Providers (Meralco, Electric Cooperatives,
Suppliers of generator sets) (18) Philvolcs (19) PAGASA
(20) National Water Resources Board (21) Department of Science
and Technology and (22) Department of Environment and Natural
Resources.
Countermeasures Against Terrorism
1. Physical Counter measures
a.
Free access to water reservoirs should be limited or eliminated
b. Security fencing for pumping stations, intakes,
treatment plants must be constructed in such a way that
vandalism will be eliminated.
c. Intrusion Alarms should be installed to notify
authorities that intruders are trying- to gain access
or have already entered limited access areas.
d. Installation of cameras with recording capabilities
of at least eight hours.
e. Communication facilities to include landline,
radio and cellphones
f. Immediate shut down mechanisms to stop operations
or limit contamination immediately.
g. Maintain a back-up equipment pool with other
water districts.
2.
Chemical Counter measures
a.
Maintain chlorine residual in the system always.
b. Add parallel raw water supply pipeline from
intake to water treatment plant and parallel finished
water transmission lines from the WTP to the main distribution
pump station.
c. Provide back-up filter wash water supply when
back wash tank is taken offline.
d. Install on-line ‘chlorine residual monitors
at strategic locations on the distribution system to aid
in mitigating biological and chemical contamination of
water supply.
e. Install fish-test aquarium at every essential
point of the water production process.
3. Institutional Countermeasures
a.
Coordinated emergency response and coordinated communications
among concerned agencies.
b. Adopting a system of standardization that encourages
cooperating agencies to use common terminology.
c. Development of partnerships/networking among
government and private agencies to devise mutual assistance
plans.
d. Communication and Coordination
e. Research
f. Inclusion of security measures In future projects.
LWUA’s
Role in DPRM
1. Policy review and formulation on
disaster preparedness and risk mitigation for the water
utilities sector.
2. Issue guidelines on requiring WDs to prepare Emergency
Response Plans.
3. Issue advisory on early warning alerts as provided by
the TFSCI or other authorities.
4. Serve as information center for incidents of disasters,
threats and risks in the WDs.
5. Conduct workshops on ERP in cooperation of other agencies
and WDs- main outcome will be documents to be used as templates
that can be modified by water districts to suit their needs.
6. Assign 501st LWUA Water Battalion as the Emergency Response
Team to assist water districts.
7. Assist in the training of water district personnel as
members of AFP AARU.
Template of an Emergency Response Plan (ERP) - a
written plan establishing operating procedures for handling
water supply emergencies. The plan shall include provisions
for emergency water supply in event of sudden loss of existing
sources, natural and man-made. It also shall specify who
does what and when, using available resources, during emergency
situations.
Recommended Outline:
A. Disaster Effects: (a) Natural Disasters
and (b) Man-made: Malevolent Acts and Non-intentional
B. Vulnerability Assessment
1. Vulnerability: (a) Contamination (b) Water Main Breaks
(c) Fuel/Chemical Spills (c) Power Outages (d) Drought
(e) Typhoons (f) Vo1canic Eruptions (g) Equipment Breakdowns
(h) Fires/Explosions (i) Vandalism/Terrorism (j) Floods
(k) EI Nino and (l) Earthquakes.
2. WSS Components: (a) Watersheds (b) Aquifers (c) Sources
(d) Dams (e) Transmission Systems (f) Reservoirs (g) Chemical
Storage (g) Personnel (h) Power Systems (i) Pumping Stations
(j) Vehicles (k) Communication Equipments and (l) Computer
and Control Systems.
3. Disaster Characteristics
4. Water Requirements Under Disaster Conditions
5. Functional Operation
6. Identification of Critical Components
C.
Protective Measures
1.
High Probability Effects and Countermeasures: (a) Contaminatign,
(b) Power Outages, (c) Communications Breakdown, (d) Transportation
Failure, and (e) Damage to Facilities.
2. Other Effects and Countermeasures
3. Consideration of Security Requirements in Plant Design
4. Protection of Personnel
D.
Emergency Operations Planning
1. Assumptions of Emergency-caused effects- differentiate
emergency situations according to the following criteria
(based on the Handbook for Water Supply Emergencies. Massachusetts
2002):
(a) Level 1- Routine Problems. Minor disruptions to
the WSS affecting 10% or less of the system and can
be repaired within 24 hours.
(b)
Level II- Alert/Minor Emergencies. Significant disruptions
to the WSS that affect 50% or less of the system and
can be repaired within 72 hrs.
(c)
Level III- Major Emergencies- Significant disruptions
to the WSS that affect more than 50% of the system and
would require more than 72 hrs. for repairs. This may
require a Declaration of Water Supply Emergency and/or
a Boil Water Order or Do Not Drink Order or Do Not Use
Order.
Level IV-Natural Disasters- disruptions in the WSS that
affect more than 50% ofth~ system and requiring more
than one week to restore services. May also require
a Declaration of Water. Supply Emergency and/or a Boil
Water Order or Do Not Drink Order or Do Not Use Order.
(e)
Level V-Terrorists Acts/Others- disruptions due to deliberate
acts that impair a WSS and/or uncontrolled release of
Biological, Chemical and Radionuclear Agents (BCRN).
Will most likely require a Declaration of Water Supply
Emergency and/or a Boil Water Order or Do Not Drink
Order or Do Not Use Order.
2. Estimate Remaining Capabilities
3. Estimate Community Water Requirements
4. Match Capabilities to Requirements
5. Specify Priorities
6. Assignment of Specific Tasks
Conclusion
A water supply operation encompasses
a multitude of vulnerabilities and risks. Both the Policy-makers
and Management are expected to focus their collective energy,
talents and resources towards guaranteeing a continuous
uninterrupted supply of potable water to the public even
at times of emergency conditions by responding to the situation
appropriately and responsibly. A well prepared Emergency
Response Plan will manifest that commitment. We protect
the health and safety of our citizenry when we protect our
water supply facilities.
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