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An
emerging issue
Disaster
preparedness for water utilities
by Engr. Antonio B. Magtibay,
MNSA
 Introduction.
The number of people affected by natural disasters has been increasing
from 147 million per year to 211 million since 1991 to 2000. More than
665,000 people died in 2,557 natural disasters, 90 percent of which
was water related. Of this water-related disasters, floods accounted
for about 50 percent, water borne diseases about 28 percent and droughts
about 11 percent.
It is projected that water-related crisis will not abate anytime soon.
The off-coast earthquake in Indonesia and the tsunami that it generated
is one of the most devastating in recent years. Though spared of that
cataclysmic event due to geographical factors, the Philippines also
had its share of water-related disasters. Thousands died in the floods
and landslides caused by typhoons and landslides in the provinces of
Quezon, Nueva Ecija, Aurora and Pampanga.
The current year was met by disasters of the man-made type. The Valentine
bombings highlighted the vulnerabilities of soft targets which the terrorists
may exploit willfully anytime. There is increasing concern that drinking
water utilities may also be targets of attacks. The Philippines Task
Force on Security of Critical Infrastructures (TFSCI) ranked water supply
among the top of the eleven possible targets of terrorists.
Today, it is no longer a question of whether natural, accidental, and
intentional disasters will occur. The question is when will they occur.
Disasters and Their Effects on Drinking Water
Supply Systems
Disasters impede development. From 1970-2000, the Philippines
incurred an annual damage of P15 Billion due to disasters. In 2004,
costs due to disasters exceeded P33.5 Billion.
Water supply systems are vulnerable to sudden unpredictable disasters
from natural and man-made disasters. Several earthquakes have adversely
affected, water sources and have caused damage to pipelines. Gen. Santos
City WD experienced increased pipe breakages along their transmission
lines whenever a spate of earthquakes will occur in the area. The Mt.
Pinatubo eruptions in 1991 partially or completely disabled the water
systems of some municipalities in Pampanga, Zambales and Tarlac. Mt.
Mayon’s eruptions have constantly affected the sources and operations
of the water districts in the immediate vicinity. Incidents of cholera
and typhoid fever are becoming more frequent and one of the causes of
the outbreaks has been attributed rightly or otherwise to the local
water districts.
Fortunately, there have been no documented terrorists attacks on water
supply facilities in the magnitude that will affect the services as
yet. However, water supply systems have certain characteristics that
make them vulnerable to terrorists attacks: the system covers a large
area that may not be monitored by the WD at all times and; the system
have components that are vulnerable to sabotage, for example, isolated
reservoirs and pumping stations.
Generally there are (2) two types of disasters that we have to contend
with and prepare for: (1) Natural Disasters. Urban infrastructure is
highly vulnerable to natural disasters. Failures of these structures,
such as water supply and other pipeline systems will most likely result
to major impacts in terms of human lives and economic losses. Natural
disasters can be any or combination of the following: (a) Typhoons.
In the period from Nov. to Dec. of 2004 only, four typhoons brought
havoc to southern Philippines: Unding, Violeta, Winnie and Yoyong. (b)
Floods (c) Heavy monsoon rains (d) Tsunamis (e) El Nino (f) Droughts
(g) Biological agents (micro-organisms, insects or vermin infestations)
(h) Earthquakes. The Philippines experience 5 quakes/day or 1,825/year
and (i) Volcanic Eruptions. (2) Man-made. Damage to or destruction of
water supply facilities by terrorists attack can disrupt the delivery
of vital human services, threaten public health and may even cause loss
of lives. Some man-made disasters are: (a) Acts of war and terrorism
(b) Vandalism (c) Fires (d) Explosions (e) Chemical spills (f) Power
failures (g) Systems Failures and (h) Accidents.
Disasters in the operations of the water utilities may also occur due
to neglect and/or failure of the organization to properly institute
and adhere to maintenance procedures.
The issue now is whether the utilities can respond to disasters to’
avert its negative effects on water services due to contamination of
water supplies, prolonged discontinuity of service, loss of fire-fighting
capability and release of chlorine in the air among others
Disaster Preparedness and Risk Mitigation (DPRM)
Generally, most water utilities have no emergency response plans in
place that should reduce the risk of water supply shortage and interruptions
and water quality deterioration both due to natural and man-made disasters.
The lessons learned by the water districts on their experience with
disasters do not accrue to the available knowledge on the subject.
Contaminated water has its direct and indirect consequences. Change
in water quality and very limited availability of water supply affect
customers’ preferences and behavior. Consumers are now developing
preference to bottled water instead of water from the taps. Every breakdown
in the water district operations resulting to reduced efficiencies are
arguments that justify the shift to bottled water by consumers.
There’s a need to properly and accurately document cholera outbreaks.
In the provinces of Pangasinan and Camarines Sur, these health problems
were initially and incorrectly attributed to public water supply systems.
Although the water quality deterioration was traced ultimately to shallow
private wells and other factors such as poor hygienic practices, the
initial negative perception of the public on the water utilities is
both costly and damaging to morale. Likewise, the responses of several
agencies, both private and government to the Infanta tragedy and similar
events must be reviewed with the end of formulating and institutionalizing
a better response to these emergencies.
The coping capability of the Legazpi City, Tabaco and Daraga water districts
which are located at the foot of Mayon Volcano on the phenomena of shifting
river flows and irregular spring sources yield will provide other similarly
situated water districts insights in their response to similar crisis.
Status of DPRM in other countries
1. The
US Federal Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act (Bioterrorism Act) June 2002 requires all community water
systems that serve 3,300 or more persons to prepare a Vulnerability
Assessment (VA) of their system. It must cover all aspects of the
system including computer systems.
2. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 of US President George
W. Bush establishes a national policy under which critical infrastructures
including drinking water “systems are to be protected from terrorists
attacks.
3. Field testing of the WHO Guidelines to Assess National Health Capacity
to the Deliberate, Use of Biological and Chemical and Radionuclear
Materials (BCRN) were conducted in some selected countries including
the Philippines wherein field testing was conducted last February
2-21, 2004 in Metro Manila and Davao.
The events
of 9/11 accelerated the development of programs required to mitigate
the vulnerabilities of drinking water utilities in developed countries.
Drinking water utilities are held responsible for providing a safe and
reliable supply of potable water to their concessionaires with or without
a disaster.
Status
of DPRM in the Philippines
Agencies Involved in Disaster Preparedness and Risk Mitigation
1. Cabinet
Oversight Committee on Internal Security (COC-IS) - Handles crisis
situation at the national level that evolve into national security
concerns.
2. National Peace and Order Council - Handles crisis situations
arising from peace and order.
3. National Disaster, Coordinating Council- PD 1566 - Responsible
for strengthening the Philippine Disaster Control Capability and Establishing
the National Program on Community Disaster Preparedness.
Advises the President on the status of National Disaster Preparedness
and Management Plans.
Recommends to the President the declaration of State of Calamity and
release of National Calamity Fund as needed.
4. Office of Civil Defense - LOI 19, S-1972
Has the primary task of coordinating the activities and functions
of various government agencies and instrumentalities, private institutions
and civic organizations for the protection and preservation of life
and property during emergencies.
5. Task Force for the Security of Critical Infrastructure (TFSCI)
- Integrates and codifies all initiatives, programs and procedures
to protect critical and vital infrastructure within the framework
of the government’s counter terrorism policies.
Identified
Critical Infrastructures: (a) Energy (b) Water Supply (c)
Information and Communication (d) Transportation (e) Banking
and Finance (f) Public Health (g) Emergency Services (h) Agriculture
and Food (i) Manufacturing (j) Government Services and (k) Strategic
Commercial Centers.
6. Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System - Both
Manila Water and Maynilad have their respective Emergency Response
Plans. These operational plans are monitored and evaluated by the
MWSS Regulatory Office.
Manila
Water has a group called Risk, Crisis and Asset Management Cluster or
the RCA Cluster. The Cluster’s objective is to make Manila Water,
as an organization, aware, prepared and ready for any crisis and emergency
that will affect their services. The programs instituted by the Manila
RCA Cluster consists of (1) Risk Management (2) Crisis Management and
(3) Asset Management.
Maynilad Water is currently focused on consequence management to mitigate
the effects of the twin crisis they are currently facing: the effects
of low water supply due to less rainfall and the reduced flow from the
Umiray sources brought about by the clogging of the 3.00 meter aqueduct
with logs and debris. The on-going program on the disconnection of illegal
connections and apprehension of booster pump users complement they over-all
program to improve the services.
Selected
Water Districts (WDs)
Zamboanga City WD. A comprehensive Disaster Preparedness
and Consequence Management is in place and constantly updated to meet
evolving threats to both the WD facilities and personnel. The Emergency
Response Plan has varied activities that include foot patrols in the
watershed to tankering of water to low pressure zones. A strong feature
of their ERP is the very strict enforcement of limited access of unauthorized
personnel to important facilities and the’complete video coverage
of high risk areas.
Urdaneta City WD. After the high incidence of amoebiasis
wherein the WDs were wrongly blamed for the tragedy, the WDs in Pangasinan
led by UCWD strengthened their institutional partnership with the DOH
and provided assistance to the affected areas that rely on shallow private
wells for their water needs. A strong and sustained media support played
an important role in the information dissemination during the crisis.
San Jose del Monte City WD. This WD have a Quick Reaction Team
that is tasked to implement their Disaster Preparedness and Risk Mitigation
Plan. Although a composite team from different operating units in the
WD, the operational capabilities of the team are further enhanced by
their training as reserve officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines Army Affiliated Reserve Unit (AFPAARU).
Recommendations
The development of an ERP for water utilities, including the water districts;
is becoming imperative. The impact of disasters on water supply and
sanitation systems, may be significantly reduced and the recovery of
these systems may be accelerated by adopting the following measures:
1. Preparation of Disaster Preparedness and Risk Mitigation Plan -
improved response to crisis will benefit the water districts through
early restoration of services and consequently renewed trust and confidence
of the consumers.
2. Development of Vulnerability Assessment tools especially for the
big to very large water districts are imperative in view of the great
impact on the daily lives of the citizenry if the water supply systems
become targets of man-made harmful acts.
3. Preparation of Vulnerability Assessments (VA) - at a minimum, the
VA must cover the entire system including computer or other automated
systems. AVA may have the following sections: (a) System description
and history; (b) Major Threats Review (man-made and natural disasters);
(c) Existing Deterrents and Detection Methods; (d) Site Specific Review;
(e) Risk Assessment; (f) Response and Recovery Methods and (h) Recommendations
for Improvements. (from Comprehensive Environmental. Inc. Technical
Revort).
1. System Description and History- a review of pipes and conveyances,
physical barriers, water collection, pretreatment, treatment, storage
and distribution facilities, electronic, computer systems controlling
the water systems, use and handling of chemicals.
2. Major Threats Review- threats that will substantially disrupt the
ability of the system to provide safe and reliable supply of drinking
water or otherwise present significant public health concerns.
3. Existing Deterrents and Detection Methods.
4. Site Specific Review. Water supply shortages are not always due
calamitous events or terrorism. Gaps in water supply and demand may
be due to over-all inability of policy makers and management to foresee
the requirements of the served population and were remiss in their
task of identifying new resources for their growing population. The
VA will identify disasters according to:
a.
Natural
b. Man-made (not deliberate). Lack or poor maintenance- contamination
may occur due to poor maintenance and/or lack of monitoring to identify
potential points of contamination of the WDs facilities. Operational
lapses. Accidents.
c. Malevolent Acts. Physical disruption. Actual damage to pump stations,
pipelines and other facilities that reduces capability of WD to
deliver water services to its constituents. Bioterrorism/chemical
contamination. Contamination of water supply. Cyber Attacks-
can affect SCADA and other platforms in the WD computer systems.
5. Risk
Assessment- define risk in tenns of the following three basic questions:
(l) What can go wrong (scenario)?, (2) Will it happen (likelihood)?
and (3) If it happens, does it matter (consequences)? The steps may
include the following: (a) Planning (b) Threat Assessment (c) Site
Characterization (d) Consequence Assessment (e) System Effectiveness
(f) Risk Analysis. Water Distribution System is one of the most vulnerable
component of a WSS. (a) Identification contamination and (b) Minimize
further spread of contamination. Pumping Stations- could be protected
better by installing them below grade. Reservoirs- especially the
open ones may be contaminated by bird droppings, decomposing leaves
or insects. On-site Guard Force- enhanced physical security. Technological
Adaptations- development of specially manufactured large diameter
flexible polyurethane hose to interconnect damage transmission lines.
Real-time monitoring of water quality in every phase of the water
supply production to delivery. Site stocking of frequently damage
components, i.e., pipes;
6. Response and Recovery Methods- restoration of levels of service
with appropriate quality is a vital lifeline with topmost priority
in any crisis situation and the prompt availability of potable and
fire-fighting water is fundamental prerequisite to mitigate the impacts
of any crisis. (a) Framework for clean-up and recovery and (b) Improved
Response Protocols- addresses the attack before contamination occurs
Other
Protective Measures
1. Bottling Capabilities for WDs - besides providing potable water,
WDs should now embark on making potable water portable and handy. (a)
The changing life-style of people requires them to be with their own
bottled water. And (b) Emergency need for water can only be acted immediately
by shipping or transporting water in bottles.
2. Public Information - incident reports, operations center, an official
spokesperson should be designated. This will include issuances of public/consumer
precautionary ‘measures and advisories such as Boil Water Orders
and installation of signages to the effect.
3. Coordination with other agencies and/or institutions - adequate institutional
and organizational arrangements should be undertaken as may be necessary.
There must he clearly defined roles, ‘common terminology, mutual
assistance plans among the entities involved in the endeavor. Information
exchange among the agencies should be enhanced by internet interactive
information exchange system. (1) Local Government Units (2) Philippine
National Police (3) Media (4) Local Water Utilities Administration (5)
MWSS (6) Manila Water (7) Maynilad (8) Water Districts (9) National
Disaster Coordination Center (10) Office of Civil Defense (11) Philippine
National Red Cross (12) Bureau of Fire Protection (13) Telecommunications
Companies (14.) Amateur Radio Associations (15) Department of Health
(16) Department of Public Works and Highways (17) Power Providers (Meralco,
Electric Cooperatives, Suppliers of generator sets) (18) Philvolcs (19)
PAGASA (20) National Water Resources Board (21) Department of Science
and Technology and (22) Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
Countermeasures Against Terrorism
1. Physical Counter measures
a.
Free access to water reservoirs should be limited or eliminated
b. Security fencing for pumping stations, intakes, treatment
plants must be constructed in such a way that vandalism will be eliminated.
c. Intrusion Alarms should be installed to notify authorities
that intruders are trying- to gain access or have already entered
limited access areas.
d. Installation of cameras with recording capabilities of at
least eight hours.
e. Communication facilities to include landline, radio and
cellphones
f. Immediate shut down mechanisms to stop operations or limit
contamination immediately.
g. Maintain a back-up equipment pool with other water districts.
2. Chemical
Counter measures
a.
Maintain chlorine residual in the system always.
b. Add parallel raw water supply pipeline from intake to water
treatment plant and parallel finished water transmission lines from
the WTP to the main distribution pump station.
c. Provide back-up filter wash water supply when back wash
tank is taken offline.
d. Install on-line ‘chlorine residual monitors at strategic
locations on the distribution system to aid in mitigating biological
and chemical contamination of water supply.
e. Install fish-test aquarium at every essential point of the
water production process.
3.
Institutional Countermeasures
a.
Coordinated emergency response and coordinated communications among
concerned agencies.
b. Adopting a system of standardization that encourages cooperating
agencies to use common terminology.
c. Development of partnerships/networking among government
and private agencies to devise mutual assistance plans.
d. Communication and Coordination
e. Research
f. Inclusion of security measures In future projects.
LWUA’s
Role in DPRM
1. Policy review and formulation on disaster preparedness and risk mitigation
for the water utilities sector.
2. Issue guidelines on requiring WDs to prepare Emergency Response Plans.
3. Issue advisory on early warning alerts as provided by the TFSCI or
other authorities.
4. Serve as information center for incidents of disasters, threats and
risks in the WDs.
5. Conduct workshops on ERP in cooperation of other agencies and WDs-
main outcome will be documents to be used as templates that can be modified
by water districts to suit their needs.
6. Assign 501st LWUA Water Battalion as the Emergency Response Team
to assist water districts.
7. Assist in the training of water district personnel as members of
AFP AARU.
Template of an Emergency Response Plan (ERP) - a written plan
establishing operating procedures for handling water supply emergencies.
The plan shall include provisions for emergency water supply in event
of sudden loss of existing sources, natural and man-made. It also shall
specify who does what and when, using available resources, during emergency
situations.
Recommended Outline:
A. Disaster Effects: (a) Natural Disasters and (b) Man-made: Malevolent
Acts and Non-intentional
B. Vulnerability Assessment
1. Vulnerability: (a) Contamination (b) Water Main Breaks (c) Fuel/Chemical
Spills (c) Power Outages (d) Drought (e) Typhoons (f) Vo1canic Eruptions
(g) Equipment Breakdowns (h) Fires/Explosions (i) Vandalism/Terrorism
(j) Floods (k) EI Nino and (l) Earthquakes.
2. WSS Components: (a) Watersheds (b) Aquifers (c) Sources (d) Dams
(e) Transmission Systems (f) Reservoirs (g) Chemical Storage (g) Personnel
(h) Power Systems (i) Pumping Stations (j) Vehicles (k) Communication
Equipments and (l) Computer and Control Systems.
3. Disaster Characteristics
4. Water Requirements Under Disaster Conditions
5. Functional Operation
6. Identification of Critical Components
C. Protective
Measures
1. High
Probability Effects and Countermeasures: (a) Contaminatign, (b) Power
Outages, (c) Communications Breakdown, (d) Transportation Failure,
and (e) Damage to Facilities.
2. Other Effects and Countermeasures
3. Consideration of Security Requirements in Plant Design
4. Protection of Personnel
D. Emergency
Operations Planning
1. Assumptions of Emergency-caused effects- differentiate emergency
situations according to the following criteria (based on the Handbook
for Water Supply Emergencies. Massachusetts 2002):
(a)
Level 1- Routine Problems. Minor disruptions to the WSS affecting
10% or less of the system and can be repaired within 24 hours.
(b)
Level II- Alert/Minor Emergencies. Significant disruptions to the
WSS that affect 50% or less of the system and can be repaired within
72 hrs.
(c)
Level III- Major Emergencies- Significant disruptions to the WSS
that affect more than 50% of the system and would require more than
72 hrs. for repairs. This may require a Declaration of Water Supply
Emergency and/or a Boil Water Order or Do Not Drink Order or Do
Not Use Order.
Level
IV-Natural Disasters- disruptions in the WSS that affect more than
50% ofth~ system and requiring more than one week to restore services.
May also require a Declaration of Water. Supply Emergency and/or
a Boil Water Order or Do Not Drink Order or Do Not Use Order.
(e)
Level V-Terrorists Acts/Others- disruptions due to deliberate acts
that impair a WSS and/or uncontrolled release of Biological, Chemical
and Radionuclear Agents (BCRN). Will most likely require a Declaration
of Water Supply Emergency and/or a Boil Water Order or Do Not Drink
Order or Do Not Use Order.
2. Estimate Remaining Capabilities
3. Estimate Community Water Requirements
4. Match Capabilities to Requirements
5. Specify Priorities
6. Assignment of Specific Tasks
Conclusion
A water supply operation encompasses a multitude of vulnerabilities
and risks. Both the Policy-makers and Management are expected to focus
their collective energy, talents and resources towards guaranteeing
a continuous uninterrupted supply of potable water to the public even
at times of emergency conditions by responding to the situation appropriately
and responsibly. A well prepared Emergency Response Plan will manifest
that commitment. We protect the health and safety of our citizenry when
we protect our water supply facilities.
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